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Beyond Totem and Taboo: Toward a Narrowing
of American Criminal Record Exceptionalism
I. Introduction
According to a recent estimate, people with a felony con-
viction in the United States account for 8 percent of the
overall population (nearly twenty-five million people).1
Individuals with a misdemeanor conviction are likely even
more, considering that over ten million misdemeanor cases
are filed every year.2 Having a criminal conviction on one’s
personal record hinders people’s lives long after the court-
imposed punishment has been served in full. Conviction
records activate an increasingly broad range of de jure and
de facto disabilities and restrictions that are ‘‘collateral’’
only in the formal sense of the word.3 The piling up of
statutory collateral sanctions and disqualifications is cou-
pled with various forms of discrimination arising from the
increased accessibility of criminal history information in
today’s digital age.4
The current widespread availability of criminal history
records in the United States is unprecedented in the
country’s history and unparalleled in any other developed
nation of the Western world. It is fair to maintain that U.S.
criminal record policy represents a striking example of
American exceptionalism.5 Today’s ubiquitous system of
access to criminal records—through government databases
and websites as well as commercial providers—make it
nearly impossible for an individual to leave her criminal
history behind. Technological innovations have exponen-
tially increased accessibility, dissemination, and use of
criminal history information. The commodification of
criminal records has multiplied the negative ramifications
of the attachment of the ‘‘criminal’’ label.
Over time, the public availability of criminal records has
acquired totemic importance largely derived from an
increasing risk aversion toward individuals with a criminal
past6 and an exaggerated symbolic significance attributed to
the First Amendment with regard to the openness of court
records.7 Recent signs, however, would seem to suggest
that an open discussion on criminal record accessibility and
management is no longer taboo. Although the debate on
criminal justice reform thus far has tended to stay in safe
territory—mostly focusing on low-level, nonviolent offen-
ders—at the same time policymakers increasingly appear
willing to consider the adoption of measures aimed at
promoting the reintegration of ex-offenders into the com-
munity while protecting public safety. The two compre-
hensive reports on restoration of rights and record-closing
legislation at the state level recently published by the Col-
lateral Consequences Resource Center provide ample proof
of it.8
My central argument in this article is that the awareness
of what having a criminal record means today in the United
States calls for the adoption of new policies limiting access
to criminal history information by third parties and pre-
venting sealed and expunged records from resurfacing.
After briefly describing the U.S. criminal record infra-
structure, I will turn my attention to the challenges that the
digital age and the Internet have posed to criminal records
management policy and practice. I will then proceed to
consider and discuss pros and cons of ‘‘forgetting’’ and
‘‘forgiving’’ models, expressing a preference for a third
option, which I term ‘‘forgetting through forgiving.’’ In the
concluding section, I will outline a few policy recommen-
dations to address the problems arising from how criminal
records are currently accessed, disseminated, and utilized.
II. The U.S. Criminal Record Infrastructure
A. Government Criminal History Repositories
Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
a centralized criminal history record repository.9 Criminal
record repositories are made up of criminal records from
across the state, including law enforcement records, crim-
inal court records, corrections records, and sex offender
state registries. All this information is combined and kept
in one database. Information included and rules of access
to criminal history records vary from state to state.10
It must be noted that not all states grant the public
access to criminal history information maintained in such
repositories for non-criminal justice purposes. This is
because public access to government-held records is regu-
lated differently from state to state.11 Although access to
government records is an important element that helps
keep democratic governments transparent and accountable,
public records statutes at the federal and state level that give
the public the right to access various government docu-
ments ‘‘stem from legislative decision, not constitutional
command.’’12
A distinction is usually drawn between ‘‘open’’ and
‘‘closed’’ records states. Open records states allow anyone to
have unrestricted access to criminal history records for any
purpose, including commercial dissemination.13 In
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contrast, in closed records states access to criminal history
information is only available to authorized users—usually
law enforcement agencies, volunteer organizations, and
certain employers who must comply with federal or state
statutory requirements regarding employees’ criminal his-
tory.14 Furthermore, in closed records states the commer-
cial dissemination of criminal history information obtained
through state repositories is generally prohibited.15 In some
states, disclosure to third parties is allowed contingent upon
the subject of the search signing a release authorization
form.16
At the federal level, the fingerprint-based FBI criminal
history repository qualifies as a closed record system.17 In
addition to federal criminal records, the FBI-maintained
Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) system
includes criminal records submitted by all states and terri-
tories and indexed through the FBI’s Interstate Identifica-
tion Index (known informally as ‘‘Triple I’’), ‘‘an interstate/
federal-state computer network for conducting national
criminal history record searches.’’18 The FBI shares crimi-
nal history information for purposes of employment,
licensing, and other non-criminal justice purposes, pro-
vided it is authorized to do so by a federally approved state
statute designating specific purposes for which state agen-
cies and users may request and receive FBI-maintained
CHRI.19
B. Criminal Court Records
Beyond the dichotomy between open and closed records
jurisdictions with respect to executive branch record
repositories, criminal history information can be obtained
from the court system at the local, state, and federal level.
It is often maintained that adult criminal court records are
open to the public. This way, all fifty-two U.S. jurisdictions
(the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government) would qualify as ‘‘open records’’ jurisdictions
when it comes to requesting someone’s criminal history
information maintained at the court level.
In fact, although the U.S. Supreme Court granted the
press and public a First Amendment right of access to
judicial proceedings in criminal cases,20 it has ‘‘never
addressed the question of whether there is a constitutional
right of access . . . to court records.’’21 In Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc. (1978), the Court found a common
law right of access to judicial records, but also noted that
‘‘the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not abso-
lute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records
and files, and access has been denied where court files
might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.’’22
From this follows that rules governing access to criminal
court records nationwide are not comprehensive, and in
many cases judges develop rules on their own.23
C. Private Vendors
Finally, as we shall see in the following section, besides
centralized repositories and the court system, private
commercial vendors have arisen over the past few decades
to become the ‘‘third pillar’’ of the U.S. criminal record
infrastructure. The pace of growth of the private back-
ground checking industry, especially since the 1990s, has
been no less than staggering.
III. Conviction Records in the Digital Age
Beginning in the 1970s, state criminal history repositories
and court records have been gradually reformatted and
transferred to computerized, searchable databases.24 But
that was only the prelude to an even greater shift in criminal
records management nationwide. The online availability of
criminal history information has been a game changer.
It has been estimated that today roughly nine-in-ten
American adults use the Internet (up from half in 2000)
and over 70 percent of them have broadband Internet ser-
vice at home (up from 1 percent in 2000).25 The Internet
has not only revolutionized access to criminal records, but
also the public’s perception of risk associated with people
with a criminal past. Digitized criminal history repositories
in open records states were gradually made accessible
online upon the payment of reasonable fees. The same
happened with state and county court system databases.26
Furthermore, today state and county court system websites
generally provide ready access to information regarding
pending and closed criminal cases.27
These factors have contributed to the rapid and expo-
nential growth of the private background checking indus-
try. Commercial providers of criminal background checks
purchase records in bulk from accessible repositories, use
data extraction and collection software to harvest databases
available online, and send runners to courts to collect
additional information. Then, they make money selling
criminal history information to the public online.28 Back-
ground checking companies are not organized at the state
level nor have to follow the same laws and regulations
concerning access to and update of criminal records that
apply to public repositories.29 Commercial vendors of
criminal records are legally considered consumer report
agencies and are therefore regulated by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).30
It is fair to say that conviction information has never
been more widely accessible and disseminated at any point
in U.S. history. Mass dissemination of criminal records has
become a hallmark of our times.31 The digital revolution in
government record-keeping practices, the online availability
of court and state criminal history databases, and the pro-
liferation of online commercial vendors have completely
transformed the relationship of the public with criminal
records. As stressed by the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, the ‘‘growing obsession with back-
ground checking and commercial exploitation of arrest and
conviction records makes it all but impossible for someone
with a criminal record to leave the past behind.’’32
Furthermore, even when no background check is run,
the reentry process of ex-offenders can also be hindered by
the ability to quickly and easily find information online (the
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so-called Google effect). It has become standard practice in
the context of everyday professional and personal relation-
ships to google somebody and get instantly a list of every-
thing ever posted about that person, including criminal
history information.
IV. Are Sealing and Expungement Statutes Still Relevant?
‘‘Expungement aims to wipe the record clean after a suffi-
cient period of law-abiding behavior. Sealing makes the
record inaccessible, except to those with statutory authori-
zation or a court order.’’33 Both practically and symbolically,
such schemes are potentially capable of having multiple
beneficial implications for ex-offenders, eliminating
stigma, discrimination, and negative attitudes expressed
toward them by society. This said, laws are rarely clear
about whether sealing and expungement schemes actually
eliminate mandatory restrictions.
Yet the advent of the digital age has also considerably
undermined the significance of sealing and expungement
schemes as reliable mechanisms to provide eligible offen-
ders with a fresh start and a blank slate. Despite the
increasing enactment of record-closing legislation, the fol-
lowing question must be asked: do sealing and expunge-
ment laws still have a valuable role to play in the digital age?
Modern technologies have given non-criminal justice
actors unprecedented access to criminal history informa-
tion via the Internet, and this represents the primary threat
to the effectiveness of legislation inspired by the ‘‘forget-
ting’’ model.34 The process of getting a record expunged or
sealed can be difficult and expensive, yet there is no guar-
antee that, once a record has been set aside, it will no longer
be disclosed.
The main providers of criminal history information to
the public—state repositories and commercial background
check companies—face similar limitations in this regard.
In the case of government databases, variations in update
frequency often lead to sealed or expunged records being
wrongfully revealed. Inaccurate and outdated criminal
records, however, come primarily from private data aggre-
gators that sell data to businesses and private individuals.
Expunged or sealed criminal records are not infrequently,
to employ an understatement, incorrectly reported because
private vendors do not update their databases regularly.35
The FCRA requires background check companies to take
‘‘reasonable steps’’ to make sure that the information they
provide is current and accurate.36 Unfortunately, this is not
always the case. Deficiencies of enforcement mechanisms,
a certain degree of ambiguity in regulatory guidance, and
practical difficulties in constantly keeping databases up to
date make the problem of inaccurate and outdated criminal
records hard to eradicate. In addition, past convictions,
even if formally sealed or expunged, often resurface on the
Internet, for example after a local newspaper’s archives
have been digitized and made available online. In contrast,
in a not-so-distant past, ‘‘recovering facts about a conviction
from a prior edition of a newspaper required far more time
and effort.’’37
Over a decade ago, legal commentator Adam Liptak
observed, ‘‘real expungement is becoming significantly
harder to accomplish in the electronic age.’’38 Since those
words were written, things have only gotten worse. Ex-post
remedies seem of little help: a dispute over whether
a criminal record had been sealed or expunged after the
information has already been disclosed to an employer,
a landlord, a volunteer association, or a date is largely
pointless. The harm has already been done.
V. Facing Challenges in Managing the ‘‘Ex-Con’’ Label
in the Digital Age
The unprecedented accessibility to and dissemination of
criminal conviction records information have profoundly
transformed the experience of being labeled a criminal.39
It is becoming increasingly apparent that reforms and dif-
ferent approaches are needed to meet the challenges
brought about by digital technologies resulting in the
enhanced public visibility of convictions. In this section,
I first argue that technological developments, coupled with
the advent of the ‘‘risk society’’40 increasingly preoccupied
with safety and crime prevention, fueled the appetite for
criminal records. A balancing approach should be adopted
and new policies regarding the access to and management
of criminal history information developed. I then maintain
that privacy is not the most suitable interest to be balanced
against pervasive risk prevention concerns. Rather, those
interests are to be identified in the aggregated interest of
society in the successful reintegration of people who com-
mitted a crime and the requirement of a proportionate
punishment. Finally, I discuss the viability of a ‘‘right to be
forgotten online’’ in the U.S. context.
A. Criminal Records, Risk Aversion, and
Technological Development
In Paul v. Davis (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
no constitutional right to privacy exists that prohibits a state
from publicizing criminal records.41 However, in U.S.
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press (1989)—a third party’s FOIA request case
addressing the refusal to disclose an individual’s personal
FBI criminal record—the Court first recognized the doc-
trine of practical obscurity. In light of late 1980s record-
keeping practices, the Court held that ‘‘plainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found
after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and
a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse
of information.’’42 This means that public documents that
are difficult or time-consuming to locate essentially become
private records, and citizens are entitled to a privacy interest
in the practical obscurity of such records. While obscurity is
not synonymous with privacy, the Court found that a per-
son possesses a privacy interest in information that is hard
to obtain although technically available to the public.
The ruling in Reporters Committee was well-grounded so
long as practical obscurity of otherwise public records was
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the norm. But once an impressive amount of criminal
records became readily accessible online as a result of the
mass digitization of public records and the rapid spread of
the Internet, the privacy interest in the practical obscurity of
such records has been deemed superseded.43
This line of argument seems to be largely predicated on
the idea that technology cannot be stopped. From such
a perspective, the hyper-visibility and dissemination of con-
viction information should be simply regarded as an inevi-
table reality of our times. In the management of criminal
records, over time technology got ahead of us and criminal
justice practices have merely adapted to changes brought by
the digital revolution in a largely unreflective way. I certainly
acknowledge that technology can be extremely useful for
criminal justice purposes (from CCTV to electronic moni-
toring, from police body cameras to advanced risk assess-
ment tools). Yet technology should not dictate the agenda or
be passively and uncritically embraced. In other words, the
mere fact that technology allows something to happen is
simply not a good enough reason to let that happen.
It is hard to view bulk selling of digitized criminal
records online as the natural evolution of granting access to
public records to enable the public to check what the gov-
ernment and the courts are up to. Rather, technological
developments have critically contributed to enhance social
anxiety about the risk of dealing with persons who have
been convicted of a crime, regardless of the seriousness of
the offense of conviction. The public’s need for disclosure
of criminal record information was not as pressing an issue
four decades ago as it is today. People increasingly rely on
online background checks—just one click of the mouse
away—not only in the employment setting but also in many
other everyday life contexts such as dating, neighboring,
friendship, and voluntary associations.44
At the intersection between the risk society and the
digital age, the mantra for which ‘‘we need to know about
a person’s criminal history to keep ourselves safe’’ has
become imperative. Technology has enabled and incentiv-
ized a hyper-precautionary societal mindset that resulted in
new or heightened forms of criminal record discrimination
against ex-offenders, ‘‘who may be trying to reform them-
selves or whose offences may in fact be quite mild.’’45 As
a result, policies and practices are now too unbalanced on
the side of public safety at the expense of any possible
competing interest.
B. Criminal Justice Exceptionalism and Criminal
Records Management
A balancing approach should be adopted to implement
a more just approach to criminal records management. As
it has been noted, shifts in law and policy are necessary not
only ‘‘to avoid staleness and obsolescence in light of new
technologies’’ but also to avoid that new technologies dis-
rupt the delicate balance between equally important
interests.46
Is the interest protected by the right to privacy the one to
invoke to limit access to criminal history information? My
answer is no. The American understanding of privacy is,
first and foremost, aimed at protecting individual liberty
(i.e., freedom from the government), while other pervasive
forms of intrusion in the citizens’ everyday life (like, for
example, consumer credit reports and criminal background
checks) are widely accepted and tolerated. Unlike the
United States, Europe embraces a dignity-based notion of
privacy, which is mainly focused on the protection of each
person’s public image.47 Arguing that U.S. jurisdictions
should adopt a European-like notion of privacy to justify the
enactment of policies aimed at limiting the disclosure of
criminal history information would be at odds with basic
principles and values of U.S. law. Therefore, the case for the
enhanced confidentiality of criminal history records that are
not sealed or expunged should be assessed through differ-
ent lenses.
My argument is that the criminal justice framework,
including the records and information it generates, is dif-
ferent from any other branch of the legal system. People’s
interests at stake are exceptionally high. The same does not
happen in any other area of the law. The hard treatment,
stigma, and burdensome collateral consequences that flow
from a criminal conviction ‘‘are unmatched by even the
most serious forms of civil liability.’’48 I refer to this as
criminal justice exceptionalism.
Criminal justice exceptionalism applies indistinctively
on both sides of the Atlantic. This seems to be confirmed by
the fact that across Europe criminal records were not pub-
licly available well before the adoption of the 1981 Council
of Europe Personal Data Convention49 and the 1995
European Union Data Protection Directive.50 Suprana-
tional rules simply reflected pre-existing views at the
national level, which considered criminal records as espe-
cially sensitive information but certainly not for privacy-
related reasons. Rather, social reintegration of ex-offenders
was the primary concern. The same approach was widely
embraced in pre-1980s United States.51 No claim of
American exceptionalism can be put forward.
In today’s information society, criminal history records
stay with an individual long after the formal punishment
has been served, regardless of how minor the crime and
whether the ex-offender’s rehabilitation efforts were suc-
cessful. This fact can no longer be neglected in the con-
versation on how to improve the management of criminal
records. Criminal records should not be seen as or treated
like any other public record in light of this awareness.
Specific rules should be enacted taking into account the
exceptionally debilitating consequences flowing from hav-
ing a criminal conviction on record.
In particular, access to and disclosure of criminal history
records should be balanced against the aggregated societal
interest to a successful reintegration of ex-offenders after
the punishment has been served in full.52 Social exclusion
of ex-offenders has been traditionally identified as a major
determinant of recidivism.53 This comes at a high cost to
society not only in terms of public safety but also in terms of
taxpayers’ money.54 Therefore, a wider interest exists in
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limiting the continuing stigmatization and exclusion from
society of those individuals with a criminal record who do
not pose a threat to their community and are actively trying
to settle back into a law-abiding life. Furthermore, the
requirement for which ‘‘a criminal deserves to suffer pro-
portionately to the seriousness of the crime committed’’
should also be taken into account.55 After all, if ‘‘the state
has the power to ensure that offenders are not subjected to
hard treatment and deprivation at the hands of people who
lack lawful authority,’’ then it should also limit the amount
of post-conviction stigma and discrimination imposed on
ex-offenders by private parties.56 Especially for low-level
offenses, a criminal record should not be a life sentence.
C. A ‘‘Right to Be Forgotten’’ Online
for the United States?
The advent of digitized records, Big Data, and the Internet
means that criminal history information is more widely and
readily available today than ever before. Yet enhanced stig-
matization and other collateral consequences flow not only
from criminal history information obtained online from
government databases, court websites, or private vendors.
News media, crime watch blogs, and social media also
represent major sources of information that can massively
amplify the negative ramifications of having a criminal
conviction on record.57 Furthermore, as previously noted,
they have the ability to frustrate the effectiveness of sealing
and expungement remedies. Should information about
criminal convictions be returned in a search for an indivi-
dual’s name ad infinitum? Would the recognition and
implementation of a ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ online be
a viable option to address this issue?
A right to be forgotten, as originally defined, would
allow individuals to ‘‘determine the development of their
life in an autonomous way, without being perpetually or
periodically stigmatized as a consequence of a specific action
performed in the past.’’58 A landmark judgment of the Court
of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (CJEU) in the case ofGoogle
Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de
Datos and Mario Costeja Gonza´lez (2014) has recently popu-
larized the expression ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ with specific
regard to online search engines. The ruling allows private
citizens in European countries to request that search engines
delist information about themselves returned by an online
search for their full name when that information is ‘‘inac-
curate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.’’59
Two are the major takeaways from the case for the
purposes of the present discussion. (1) The ‘‘right to be
forgotten online’’ (or ‘‘right to be delisted’’) label has proven
somewhat misleading. In practical terms, no content is
deleted in its original location on the Internet. A delisted
link simply will no longer appear in search results for
a person’s name. This means that the exact same content
could still be retrieved through the same search engine
using a different search query. (2) The right to be forgotten
online is not absolute. It will always need to be balanced
against other fundamental rights—such as, primarily,
freedom of speech—which are not absolute either. Practi-
cally speaking, this means that the company running the
search engine must assess requests from users on a case-
by-case basis.
As a de facto monopolist, Google has received nearly
700,000 requests to delist over 2.5 million URLs from
search results since the judgment was issued, many of
them regarding criminal convictions.60 The company has
specifically stated that, in deciding what to delist, they
would apply the criteria developed by the CJEU but also
look at whether there is a ‘‘public interest’’ in the infor-
mation remaining available in search results.61 Criminal
convictions are indicated alongside financial scams, pro-
fessional malpractice, and conduct of government officials
as information for which delisting of search results may be
denied on such grounds.62 Examples of delisted links
related to criminal convictions published by Google in its
transparency report on the implementation of the Google
Spain judgment suggest the following: search results are
likely to be delisted when they refer to convictions for minor
crimes pronounced several years earlier and convictions for
serious crimes that occurred at least a decade earlier, either
when the conviction has been sealed or expunged or when
the ex-offender has been deemed rehabilitated under
national law and does not appear to pose a threat to others.
Delisting will instead almost certainly be denied with
regard to recent convictions, generally regardless of the
seriousness of the offense.63
Most likely, in the United States, the First Amendment
would be invoked to protect Google and any online search
company that publish, resurface, or otherwise make avail-
able criminal history information, especially in the case of
information from judicial proceedings and records; and
this even when the record has been sealed or expunged.64
Nevertheless, American scholars have already put forward
a compelling case for ‘‘practical obscurity online.’’65 As
noted by Professor Eric Posner, ‘‘Critics of the European
right to be forgotten need to explain why they disagree with
the balance between free expression and privacy that the
law reached until the digital era—when the barrier of the
physical search almost always provided adequate protection
for privacy.’’66 ‘‘Right to be forgotten’’ online rules would
crucially complement much-needed reforms addressing
the public availability of criminal history information
through government-held databases and background check
companies. They would effectively tackle the Internet’s
ability to emphasize the past and Google’s contribution to
the growth of the bias against ex-offenders ‘‘even years or
decades after completing their sentence.’’67
VI. Restoration of Rights and Status: Beyond
the Binary Approach
When rehabilitation was in its ascendancy, state and federal
legislatures started to pass laws introducing or expanding
the possibility of sealing or expunging adult convictions,68
in so doing making the criminal justice system for adults
more similar to the juvenile justice system.69 This reform
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movement completely lost momentum during the tough-
on-crime era: mercy and forgiveness appeared too soft to be
politically feasible.70 In today’s penal climate, criminal
justice reform initiatives are paying non-negligible atten-
tion to the issue of criminal records management,71 espe-
cially if compared to the recent past.
Recent state legislation has shown a clear preference for
the ‘‘forgetting’’ model in which criminal records are
expunged or sealed and kept from disclosure, and thereby
forgotten. Notably, in 2017 the ‘‘most frequent type of
reform’’ passed by the states with the goal of reducing
barriers to reentry faced by ex-offenders involved ‘‘limiting
public access to criminal records.’’72 State legislatures are
leaning toward statutes that ‘‘rewrite’’ history, though
extremely carefully. Typically, only misdemeanors or minor
nonviolent felonies can be sealed or expunged, and often
only after substantial waiting periods.73 Therefore, cur-
rently not only are such remedies available to a relatively
small number of ex-offenders long after the sentence has
been served, but the described technological developments
also radically question the persisting utility of sealing and
expungement statutes.
A. Forgiving
The preference of the collateral consequences provisions of
the Model Penal Code: Sentencing project for the ‘‘forgiving’’
model has been dictated in part by this very practical con-
cern: sealing and expungement laws may not work any-
more in the digital age. A person trying to hide her criminal
history by means of those legislative tools would likely fail
and be labeled a felon and a liar. Even if a conviction cannot
be sealed or expunged, an ex-offender may still be able to
achieve relief through a certificate of rehabilitation remov-
ing all mandatory collateral consequences to which the
petitioner would otherwise be subject under the law.74
TheModel Penal Code: Sentencing proposes a detailed test
that differs depending on the seriousness of the offense. For
minor felonies and misdemeanors, the court shall ‘‘issue the
certificate whenever the individual has avoided reconviction
during the period following completion of his or her past
criminal sentences.’’ When the individual has been con-
victed of a serious felony, the court (or the designated
agency) ‘‘may issue a certificate of restoration of rights if,
after reviewing the record, it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the individual has shown proof of successful
reintegration into the law-abiding community.’’ In making
this determination, the court shall consider a series of fac-
tors, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the
individual’s most recent conviction and the person’s prog-
ress toward rehabilitation.75
The following are my main concerns about the ‘‘forgiv-
ing’’ model. First, even if pardons and certificates of reha-
bilitation were always systematically included in a person’s
criminal record, they might not show up when a back-
ground check is run on an ex-offender when government
repositories and private vendors’ databases are outdated.
Second, issues of interpretation and relevance may also
arise especially in non-criminal justice contexts: are par-
dons and certificates of rehabilitation compelling and clear
enough to convey to broader audiences the message that an
ex-offender is to be considered as rehabilitated? Finally, yet
importantly, how are documents certifying rehabilitation
evaluated? To what degree are they ‘‘trusted’’? ‘‘Forgiving
without forgetting’’ seems to trust people to be fair in their
decisions after becoming aware of a person’s eventual
successful journey through the criminal justice system. In
this regard, legitimate doubts arise concerning the consis-
tency of outcomes of delegating the decision-making power
on whether to impose ‘‘informal’’ collateral consequences76
to private individuals who are not necessarily in the best
position to make these decisions.
B. Forgetting
Turning to the ‘‘forgetting’’ model,77 although from a policy
perspective I tend to favor this solution, I am extremely
suspicious of ‘‘forgetting’’ systems merely involving ‘‘pas-
sive redemption,’’ that is, allowing sealing or expungement
of conviction records after the lapse of a certain crime-free
period and nothing more than that. Although a dated con-
viction not followed by another gradually loses its value as
an indicator of how an ex-offender will act in the future,
being crime-free is not necessarily synonymous with evi-
dence of good behavior and productive reentry.
Critics of the ‘‘forgetting’’ model often contend that
expungement and record-sealing laws rewrite history at the
expense of historical truth, something that is ‘‘hard to
square with a legal system founded on the search for
truth.’’78 I do not find this criticism particularly compelling.
In the case of sealing and expungement procedures, what is
rewritten is the historical legal truth of the past conviction.
This erasure is aimed at giving the ex-offender a ‘‘fresh
start’’ free of social disabilities arising from the record of
conviction. Rewriting history and legal fictions are all but
unknown to the criminal justice system. For example, the
plea bargaining process allows and often involves the cre-
ation of legal facts that differ from historical facts (i.e., the
facts constituting the offense actually committed by the
defendant). This should be regarded as a threat by sup-
porters of transparent and open justice for, as a rule,
‘‘decisions by prosecutors as to the facts of a case and
a proposed determination should coincide as closely as
possible . . . to the history.’’79 Nonetheless, practical and
policy considerations—respectively, judicial economy from
the judge’s angle; rational use of limited resources from the
prosecutor’s perspective, and the opportunity to have a less
serious offense listed on one’s criminal record and receive
a lighter sentence from the defendant’s standpoint—make
plea bargaining an acceptable and necessary option at both
the federal and state level.80
C. Forgetting through Forgiving
Scholars are generally engaged in the binary debate
between ‘‘forgiving’’ and ‘‘forgetting.’’ Yet there is also
a third way that could be termed ‘‘forgetting through
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forgiving’’ by means of an ad hoc procedure of judicial
rehabilitation.81 This model recognizes a ‘‘right to reinte-
gration’’ for all convicted individuals under which rehabil-
itation is not automatic but rather merit-based. The mere
passage of time is not enough: the expungement of the
record of conviction and the restoration of rights is earned
through positive actions.82
To grant judicial rehabilitation, the court should require
the following conditions to be satisfied: (a) a crime-free
period (ideally, three to eight years depending on the seri-
ousness of the offense of conviction and the offender’s
criminal history) after the sentence has been completed;
and (b) evidence of effective rehabilitation (e.g., completing
designated treatment programs, furthering one’s educa-
tion, steady employment history, voluntary work in the
community, letters of reference, etc.).
The legal consequences of judicial rehabilitation would
be twofold: (1) the full restoration of the ex-offender’s rights
through the ‘‘expiration’’ of automatic collateral conse-
quences of conviction; and (2) the expungement of the
conviction from the ex-offender’s criminal record for
criminal and non-criminal justice purposes. In this regard,
the conviction would disappear as if it never existed.
Therefore, this conviction shall not be counted in calculat-
ing the recidivist premium at sentencing in case of a new
conviction. Similarly, if an individual has no other criminal
history, when asked if s/he has ever been convicted of
a criminal offense—for example, in the employment or
housing context—the existence of the expunged conviction
could be legally denied. Nonetheless, the court-ordered
rehabilitation and its effects will be revoked and vacated by
the same court that granted it in case the person, within five
years from the date the rehabilitation was obtained, com-
mits a felony or a misdemeanor for which jail time is
imposed.
It must be noted that many state sealing and expunge-
ment laws incorporate a requirement that the court find
rehabilitation. Sealing may be automatic where non-
conviction records are concerned, or where a person has
completed the terms of a diversion or deferred adjudication
agreement, but it is by no means automatic in most cases
involving adult convictions. Generally, state laws require
the court to apply a test, though it may be fairly general. For
example, in Vermont courts must seal most convictions for
certain crimes committed prior to age 21 two years after
final discharge, if ‘‘the person’s rehabilitation has been
attained to the satisfaction of the court.’’83 In Kansas, to seal
certain adult convictions, a court must find that ‘‘the peti-
tioner has not been convicted of a felony in the past two
years and no proceeding involving any such crime is pres-
ently pending or being instituted against the petitioner,’’
‘‘the circumstances and behavior of the petitioner warrant
the expungement,’’ and ‘‘the expungement is consistent
with the public welfare.’’84
Though promising, these provisions are limited in
scope, generally covering only low-level offenses. A desir-
able, though ambitious, reform would be to give every ex-
offender, regardless of the seriousness of the offense of
conviction, a chance to demonstrate his or her rehabilita-
tion potential and, if successful, reward this effort with
restoration of rights and the erasure of the conviction.85
VII. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Treating all ex-offenders, with no distinction whatsoever, as
a suspect class represents an unreasonable policy over-
shooting bearing enormous social and economic costs for
the community at large. In today’s society, enhanced visi-
bility of convicted persons as well as restrictions and dis-
abilities arising from the proliferation and hyper-
dissemination of criminal records have reached new
heights that seemed unimaginable as recently as the mid-
1990s. An agenda of reform is needed, aimed at reducing
harm while not jeopardizing public safety.
The background check lobby and the press would cer-
tainly not welcome reforms of this nature, to say the least.
Nevertheless, pessimism must not prevail: ‘‘evidence of the
existence of vested interests should not be construed as
evidence that change is impossible.’’86 In recent years polls
have consistently shown a growing bipartisan support for
criminal justice reform initiatives departing substantially
from the policies of the tough-on-crime era.87 It should also
be borne in mind that from the 1980s through at least the
mid-2000s voices advocating for limiting access to criminal
history records and restoring rights to ex-offenders were
a clear minority.88 On the contrary, although it is certainly
hard to put the genie back into the bottle with criminal
records now at anyone’s fingertips, in the currently ongoing
discussion on the restoration of rights to ex-offenders no
option seems a priori off the table.
Though encouraging, recent signs of narrowing of
American criminal records management exceptionalism do
not seem to predict a tectonic shift anytime in the imme-
diate future. Yet declining crimes rates and a more coop-
erative political discourse on criminal justice reform at local
and state levels provide an exceptional opportunity for
developing more just and considerate criminal records
disclosure and management systems. States are leading the
way on criminal justice reform and have wide latitude to
experiment and borrow ideas. Unfortunately, no magic
formula exists when it comes to the management of crim-
inal records in the digital age. This said, fully reintegrating
into the polity and the labor market individuals who have
served their sentence in full and do not pose any particular
risk should represent a primary policy goal nationwide.
From a normative perspective, the right of the individual to
have a fair shot at rehabilitation should trump the right to
easy access to and commercialization of criminal history
records.
The discussion in this article leads to the formulation of
the following policy recommendations:
(a) Any comprehensive register of criminal convictions
should be kept only under the control of official
authority.
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(b) Processing and management of criminal conviction
records for non-criminal justice purposes should be
carried out only under the control of official
authority.
(c) With the exceptions of approved private providers
helping official authorities to process authorized
requests, access to criminal history information by
third parties, especially for purposes of commercial
re-dissemination, should be prohibited.
(d) Consent of the individual for disclosure of criminal
history records to third parties for authorized non-
criminal justice purposes should always be
required.
(e) Criminal convictions should be disclosed in speci-
fied exceptional circumstances, for instance when
ex-offenders apply for certain types of employment
(e.g., jobs involving contact with vulnerable subjects
such as children or the elderly) or when the job is
somehow related to the past conviction (e.g., a bank
robbery conviction in relation to an application for
a position as bank cashier; gun law conviction for
a position involving the use of firearms).
(f) A certain level of education on how to assess crim-
inal records should be required for those persons,
such as employers and landlords, who are likely to
make business-related decisions based on criminal
history information at some point.
(g) With regard to court records, criminal records
should be equated to family records, which in many
U.S. jurisdictions are already treated as confidential.
As a second best, criminal court records should not
be made available online, nor sold in bulk to private
entities, but only made accessible in person in court
administration offices.89
(h) Judicial rehabilitation procedures available for all
offenses should be enacted rewarding ‘‘active’’
rehabilitation with restoration of rights and expun-
gement of the record of conviction.
(i) ‘‘Right to be forgotten’’ regulation should be adopted
to favor practical obscurity online. It should cover
search engine results involving a person’s name
with regard to convictions that have been sealed or
expunged or when an ex-offender has been deemed
judicially rehabilitated.
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